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ESSAY
JURY REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?
Nancy S. Marder*
I. Introduction
In his essay, Asking Jurors To Do the Impossible,'
Peter Tiersma identifies several ways in which jurors have
difficult, if not impossible, roles to play and suggests
several steps that courts could take to aid jurors in
performing these roles. He offers a number of
recommendations, such as having judges instruct jurors in
plain and specific language, allowing jurors to ask
questions about the instructions, and explaining to jurors
the reasons for certain rules.2  His recommendations are
sensible, and courts would do well to follow his advice.
With the exception of his call for the creation of expert
juries in technical cases,3  I agree with his
recommendations, though I think there are good reasons to
go even further than Tiersma does with several of the
reforms he proposes.
Although Tiersma's recommendations provide a
useful starting-point for courts, courts should engage in
those jury reforms that foster any of the following three
basic principles: (1) courts should be honest with jurors; (2)
courts should give jurors the tools that they need to be
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I want to thank the
Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy for inviting me to participate in
"The 2009 Summers-Wyatt Symposium: Asking Jurors To Do the
Impossible." I also want to thank Jeremy Eden for his comments on an
early draft of this essay and Lucy Moss for her library assistance.
l Peter Tiersma, Asking Jurors To Do the Impossible, 5 TENN. J.L. &
POL'Y 105 (2009).
2 Id. at 142-45, 146.
3 Id. at 139-40.
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engaged in the trial and deliberations; and (3) courts should
seek jurors that are broadly drawn from the community.
Jurors from all walks of life will bring an array of
perspectives and approaches to jury deliberations. In
addition, only if the process of selecting jurors appears fair
and above-board will the parties and members of the
community accept the jury's verdict even when they
disagree with it. If courts follow these three basic
principles, then jurors would be better able to perform their
job even though it is difficult, and at times, seemingly
impossible. To the extent that Tiersma's recommendations
are consistent with these principles, they should be
followed. However, to the extent that his recommendations
fall short of having courts carry out these basic principles,
his recommendations need to go further. Only one of his
recommendations-his call for the creation of expert
juries-should be rejected. Although jurors would be
better off with most of Tiersma's reforms than without
them, it would be a shame for courts to miss an opportunity
to undertake the kind of reforms that would truly aid jurors
in the performance of their difficult role.
I begin by looking at Tiersma's jury reforms that
are consistent with the above principles, but that should go
even further. Reforms that are consistent with these
principles will lead jurors to perform their job more
effectively and will lead members of the community to feel
more satisfied with juries and the verdicts they reach.
Then, I consider the one jury reform-the creation of
expert juries-that Tiersma suggests, but that should be
rejected because it would limit who could serve as jurors
and would undermine the effort to seek jurors drawn
broadly from the community.
2
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II. Courts Should Be Honest with Jurors
Tiersma identifies several moments when courts do
not level with jurors. These include when courts fail to
instruct jurors on the jury's power to nullify,4 when courts
fail to inform jurors whether a case is a "three-strikes"
case, 5 and when courts fail to acknowledge to jurors that
they are being asked to perform a task that is particularly
difficult, if not impossible. 6 In several of these instances,
Tiersma recommends that courts should be honest with
jurors. I agree with this approach. In one instance,
however, when judges instruct jurors that they must follow
the law and do not tell them that they have the power to
nullify, Tiersma is undecided about the steps courts should
take.7 In this situation, I think courts should be honest with
jurors and instruct them on the jury's power to nullify. 8 In
three-strikes cases, Tiersma suggests juries may have a role
to play.9 I agree, and would go further and urge courts to
be honest with jurors about three-strikes cases.'
0
A. Instructing Juries on Nullification
One instance when courts are not honest with jurors
is when they instruct jurors that they must follow the law,
but do not instruct jurors on the jury's power to nullify.
4 Id. at 122, 130.
' Id. at 112.
6 See id. at 108-22.
7 Id. at 130.
8 For a detailed discussion of nullification and why courts should
instruct juries on their power to nullify, see Nancy S. Marder, The Myth
of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U.L. REv. 877 (1999).
9 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 112.
10 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 337, 341-52, 372 (2002) (describing juries' responses to
three-strikes cases in California and suggesting that courts need to
inform jurors about three-strikes cases rather than leaving jurors to
learn by happenstance).
3
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Tiersma is ambivalent about nullification and does not take
a stand on whether juries should be instructed on this
power.'1 My recommendation is that courts should not tell
jurors that they must follow the law, when in fact they have
the power in their capacity as a jury not to follow the law.
12
Rather, courts should tell jurors that they have the power to
nullify. Of course, courts can draft the instruction carefully
so that jurors know that this power must be exercised only
in rare circumstances. 13 This information needs to come
from the court; otherwise, some jurors will have heard of
nullification, but others will not and those who are
unfamiliar with the concept will feel at a disadvantage and
will be uncertain whether or not this power really belongs
to the jury.
14
Chief Judge Bazelon, writing in dissent in United
States v. Dougherty,15 urged courts to instruct jurors on
their power to nullify. In his view, courts had to trust
jurors: "Trust in the jury is, after all, one of the
" See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 130.
12 See Marder, supra note 8, at 957 ("[N]ot only are jurors not told of
that power [of nullification], but they are told the exact opposite: They
only have the power the judge has described.").
13 Id. ("Admittedly, courts must proceed carefully so as not to foment
nullification. Nullification should be reserved for compelling cases.").
One model for an instruction on nullification could borrow from the
language of John Adams, who would instruct juries, in part, as follows:
"It is not only [a juror's] right, but his [or her] duty .. .to find the
verdict according to his [or her] own best understanding, judgment and
conscience .... " Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582, 605 (1939) (quoting 2 LIFE AND WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 253-55 (C.F. Adams ed., 1856)).
14 For an example of a case in which some members of the Fully
Informed Jury Association ("FIJA") informed several jurors of the
jury's power to nullify, resulting in a deadlocked jury, a mistrial, and a
subsequent indictment for jury tampering and criminal trespass, see
Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997).
" 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing the case of the "D.C.
Nine," who broke into the Dow Chemical Company offices and
vandalized them in protest of Dow's manufacture of napalm).
4
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cornerstones of our entire criminal jurisprudence, and if
that trust is without foundation we must re-examine a great
deal more than just the nullification doctrine."' 16 After all,
jurors are entrusted with life or death decisions. If jurors
are informed of the jury's power to nullify, they would not
only have knowledge but also guidance about when to use
it.17 His dissent did not persuade his fellow judges on his
panel, who suggested that if jurors were told of this power
they would use it excessively. 18  The majority, in an
opinion written by Judge Leventhal, reasoned that it was
better to let jurors discover this power on their own in the
few cases that seemed to call out for nullification.'
9
One difficulty if the court does not instruct jurors
that they have the power to nullify is that when jurors find
out afterward, they will feel deceived by the court. The
court should not be in the business of deceiving jurors.
Jurors try to perform their job responsibly and ably. They
also try to follow the court's instructions. When they are
told one thing and not told another, only to find out the
truth later on, then they will feel that they have been misled
by the court. It is important that jurors not feel this way
and that they return to their community feeling satisfied
with how they have been treated by the court and how they
have carried out their tasks as jurors. If the jury functions
16 Id. at 1142.
17 Id. at 1143 ("The instruction would speak in terms of acquittal, not
conviction, and it would provide no comfort to a juror determined to
convict a defendant in defiance of the law or the facts of the case.").
18 Id. at 1134 ("[T]he advocates of jury 'nullification' apparently
assume that the articulation of the jury's power will not extend its use
or extent, or will not do so significantly or obnoxiously. Can this
assumption fairly be made?").
19 Id. at 1136-37 ("[Ijt is pragmatically useful to structure instructions
in such ways that the jury must feel strongly about the values involved
in the case, so strongly that it must itself identify the case as
establishing a call of high conscience, and must independently initiate
and undertake an act in contravention of the established instructions.").
5
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as a "free school,, 20 as Alexis de Tocqueville presciently
observed, then it is important that jurors learn positive
lessons from this experience.
One former judge, B. Michael Dann, who served as
a superior court judge in Maricopa County, Arizona and
who was a catalyst for jury reform in Arizona both in his
own courtroom and in his role as head of the Arizona
Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of
Juries, 21 has written about the need to inform jurors of the
jury's power to nullify.22 Courts routinely instruct jurors
that they "must" convict if they find that all of the elements
of a crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
23
Judge Dann argues that this mandatory instruction
"invade[s] the province of the jury and violate[s] the
constitutional guarantee of an 'impartial jury."' 24 Instead,
he offers an instruction that judges could use that would
inform jurors about the jury's power to nullify while
teaching jurors that this power should be exercised
sparingly. The language is straightforward and explains
to jurors that the jury can act consistent with its conscience
20 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (Jacob
Peter Mayer & Max Lerner eds., 1966) (13' ed. 1850).
21 This committee summarized its recommendations in a report entitled
The Ariz. Supreme Court Comm. On More Effective Use of Juries,
Jurors: The Power of 12 (1994), available at www.supreme.
state.az.us/jury/Jury/jurylgl .htm. Arizona adopted eighteen of the
committee's fifty-five recommendations. See William H. Carlile,
Arizona Jury Reforms Buck Legal Traditions, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1.
22 B. Michael Dann, "Must Find the Defendant Guilty" Jury
Instructions Violate the Sixth Amendment, 91 JUDICATURE 12 (2007).
23 Id. at 14 ("[A] substantial number of state and federal trial judges
use the strongest term 'must,' or its equivalent, when instructing the
jury on its duty to convict if all the jurors agree that the law's definition
of the crime has been met by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(citation omitted).
24 Id at 12.
25 See id. at 18-19 (providing instruction).
6
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 155
and can acquit a defendant whose guilt has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that this power must be
exercised with great care and only out of good motives.
26
He urges judges to adopt his version, or to construct their
own, as long as the instruction tells jurors that the jury can
return a verdict of not guilty, even if the defendant's guilt
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but that this
should only be done in the exceptional case. Judge Dann,
though now retired from the bench, is still in the forefront
of jury reform; as of now, no federal circuit supports an
instruction on jury nullification, nor do any state courts.
27
B. Informing Juries about "Three-Strikes"
Cases
Although Judge Dann recommends instructing
jurors on nullification, no judge has taken a public stance in
favor of instructing jurors on three-strikes cases. Courts in
California, where three-strikes cases are prevalent,28 do not
26 Id. at 19 ("You should exercise your judgment and examine your
conscience without passion or prejudice, but with honesty and
understanding. You should exercise with great caution your power to
find a defendant not guilty whose guilt has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
27 See Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of
Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285, 310 n.116 (1999)
(providing a list of federal circuits that do not permit an instruction on
nullification and noting that the two states, Indiana and Maryland,
which permit judges to instruct jurors that they have the right to
determine the law as well as the facts, have since limited this
opportunity through case law).
28 California is not the only state with a three-strikes law. See David
Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of "Three Strike"
Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime
Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 572 (2000) (noting that
twenty-two states and the federal government have a three-strikes law).
However, California, unlike other states, invokes its law frequently.
See id. at 573 ("In the vast majority of the twenty-two states and the
federal government that have adopted three-strikes, the law's effect on
7
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tell a jury whether or not the case before it is a three-strikes
case.2 9  Instead, the task has fallen to lawyers to provide
hints to the jury that the case before it is a three-strikes case
30 or the task has fallen to jurors to surmise that the case is a
three-strikes case.31 The task has also fallen to prosecutors
to be circumspect about which cases they choose to bring
as three-strikes cases, particularly in Northern California
where juries are less likely to convict if they sense that a
case is a three-strikes case and the "third strike" is not for a
serious crime. 32 The problem is that juries should not have
to "guess" whether a case is a three-strikes case because if
they guess wrong they are likely to feel bad about their
crime is arguably minimal since it is rarely used. The one exception is
California where 4,468 offenders have been sentenced under the third
strike provision and over 36,043 for a second strike offense.").
29 The three-strikes law in California requires that any person who is
convicted of a serious felony and has two prior felony convictions
defined as "violent" or "serious" is to receive a sentence of twenty-five
years to life imprisonment. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999).
30 Some of the more creative efforts by defense attorneys include the
defense attorney who carried a folder marked "three strikes" across the
top, another who used baseball analogies throughout the trial, and yet
another who asked the jury: "'In 25 years from now will you have an
abiding conviction that justice was served?' Harriet Chiang, Some
Jurors Revolt Over 3 Strikes/Penalty Prospects Sway Their Verdicts,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1996, at Al.
31 For example, in the case of a man convicted of robbing a security
guard and trying to steal his car, a juror "became agitated and started to
cry when she realized it was a 'three-strikes' case." Tony Perry &
Maura Dolan, Two Counties at Opposite Poles of '3 Strikes' Debate
Crime: San Francisco is Restrictive in Applying Law, San Diego Takes
Hard Line, Approaches Reflect Will of Electorate, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
1996, at Al. As one judge remarked, sometimes juries just "smell" that
a case is a three-strikes case. Id. (quoting Judge Alex Saldamando).
32 See id ("San Francisco Dist. Atty. Arlo Smith, aware that liberal
San Francisco juries would not convict, frequently declined to
prosecute nonviolent crimes as 'three-strikes' cases. His more liberal
successor, Terence Hallinan ... has been even more restrictive.").
8
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verdict afterward.33 Although courts do not usually tell
jurors anything about sentencing because sentencing is
undertaken by the judge (and to some extent by the
prosecutor in a sentencing guidelines case because the
prosecutor can decide how to charge the case), the sentence
can be so draconian in a three-strikes case that it becomes
an instance when the commonsense judgment of a jury is
sorely needed. However, if the court does not tell the jury
that it is hearing a three-strikes case, then the jury cannot
give its commonsense judgment about whether this is an
appropriate case for a mandatory prison term of twenty-five
years to life. As Tiersma points out, with violent crimes,
the jury is likely to convict even if it is a three-strikes
case.34 However, with minor offenses, 35 such as the theft
of "a slice of pizza," 36 the jury can introduce commonsense
into the process and not have the defendant be imprisoned
for the rest of his life. With three-strikes cases, the court
should not leave the jury to guess, but should inform the
jury so that it can provide its "commonsense judgment."
37
Courts have an opportunity to provide juries with
33 For example, one juror who had served on a jury that had convicted
a woman for taking a five-dollar cut in a cocaine deal "felt deceived by
the court" after learning that the defendant would go to prison for life
under the three-strikes law. Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, '3 Strikes=
Law Causes Juror Unease in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995,
available at 1995 WL 2017381.
34 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 112.
31 See id.
36 See Frank J. Murray, Is a Pizza Worth 25 Years to Life?, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at A6 ("Opponents of California's 'three strikes
and you're out' law ... said it was excessive and absurd to invoke it
against Jerry Dwayne Williams for taking a slice of pepperoni pizza
from a group of children."); Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Gets 25 Years to
Life, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B3 ("Jerry Dewayne Williams was
sentenced to prison for 25 years to life Thursday under the state's 'three
strikes' law for stealing a slice of pepperoni pizza.").
37 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (describing the jury
as a safeguard against the exercise of arbitrary power by making
"available the commonsense judgment of the community").
9
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information that would allow them to fulfill this function
more effectively. The court's silence is a lost opportunity.
Jurors should be told when a case is a three-strikes
case so that they know that if there is a conviction there
will be a mandatory, lengthy prison sentence. Courts
should be honest with juries about this and should not leave
juries with the burden of having to guess and later on
having regrets about their verdict. Jurors have to live with
these regrets for the rest of their lives. Rendering judgment
is difficult enough-for judge or jury.38 Courts should not
make judging more difficult than it already is for jurors.
C. Acknowledging the Impossibility of Some
Jury Tasks
Tiersma urges courts to be honest with jurors and to
explain when the task they are being asked to perform is
difficult, if not impossible. He suggests that jurors would
be helped if the court acknowledged the impossibility of
the task and simply asked jurors to do the best they can.
Tiersma identifies several ways in which courts ask jurors
to do the impossible. For example, judges tell jurors to
determine the truth of what happened, even when jurors are
not given all of the information they would like to have.
3 9
Similarly, when jurors are asked to award damages and to
predict how an injury will affect a person's future job
prospects, earning power, and life span, Tiersma suggests
that courts should tell jurors that no one can predict the
future, but that they should just do this job as best they
can. Additionally, when jurors are told in a criminal case
" Robert Cover described the task of judging as "deal[ing in] pain and
death." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1609 (1986). Although Cover focused on judges, his description also
applies to juries.
See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 116-17, 130-38.
" See id at 108-09.
10
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about the presumption of innocence, Tiersma suggests that
judges should provide further explanation because this
concept is difficult for laypersons to understand. After all,
have not the police and prosecutor done their jobs and
arrested and charged the right person? Tiersma proposes
that judges explain to jurors that this is a bedrock principle
and a necessary one because prosecutors, police, and other
law enforcement can and do make mistakes.4 1 If judges
follow these suggestions and are honest with jurors, then
jurors are more likely to try to do what they have been
instructed to do and will not be as overwhelmed by their
task as they may now feel.
III. Courts Should Give Jurors the Tools To Be
Engaged Jurors
Tiersma identifies a number of reforms that courts
could undertake that would assist jurors to perform their
difficult roles. His recommendations are helpful insofar as
they encourage jurors to be engaged, but if they went just a
step further, they would enable jurors to have tools that
would lead them to be engaged participants during the trial
and the deliberations.
A. Giving Jurors Written Copies of
Instructions and Permitting Jurors To
Ask Questions about the Instructions
Tiersma points out that judges instruct jurors by
reading their instructions aloud to jurors from a written text
and that jurors would benefit from having a copy of the
written text. I quite agree, but would add that jurors
should have individual copies of the written instructions
that they can follow while the judge reads the instructions
41 See id. at I 22.41 See id. at 122-24.
11
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aloud.43 Jurors should be able to make notes on their
individual written copies of the instructions and should then
be able to take their copies with them when they enter the
jury room to deliberate. Each juror would then have his or
her own annotated copy of the written instructions to
consult during jury deliberations. One judge who gives
jurors their own written copy of the instructions reported
that deliberating juries no longer send notes to her with
legal questions. 44 She described this practice, which she
has adhered to for over a decade, as "wildly successful"
and as "an inexpensive, effective way to virtually guarantee
juror understanding of the law."
45
In some courtrooms, jurors listen to the judge's
instructions, but do not receive a written copy of the
instructions.46 It is difficult, if not impossible, to remember
several hours of instructions, given in abstruse legal
language, without being able to see the words or refer back
to them later. These jurors face an uphill battle in their
effort to understand the instructions. Without a written
text, they might ignore the instructions altogether either
because they do not remember them or because they did not
understand them and have no way to clarify what they did
not understand. If, during their deliberations, they send a
note to the judge seeking further clarification, they are
43 See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-
First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 499-500 (2006)
(describing how individual written copies of the jury instructions aid
jurors' comprehension of the instructions).
44 Jacqueline Connor, Jurors Need To Have Their Own Copies of
Instructions, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 25, 2004, at 7.
45 Id.
46 For example, in New York, courts do not provide the jury with even
a single, written copy of the jury instructions. See Terry Carter, The
Verdict on Juries, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2005, at 41, 42 (reporting on New
York's pilot studies, including giving jurors copies of the written
instructions, and noting that these practices have been tried on an
experimental basis but have not yet been adopted as accepted
practices).
12
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likely to find that the judge will simply reread relevant
portions of the instructions to them without actually
answering their question,47 or the judge could simply
ignore their requests.
48
In other courtrooms, such as those in Illinois, the
entire jury is given one written copy of the instructions to
share among all of the jurors during deliberations.
49
Although the Illinois jurors with their one copy are slightly
better off than the jurors without any written copy at all, the
Illinois jurors are limited because only one juror can see the
written instructions at a time during the deliberations.
Thus, whoever holds the instructions becomes more of an
expert than the other jurors. The Illinois jurors, like the
jurors who do not receive a written copy, were also at a
disadvantage when the instructions were read aloud by the
judge because they did not have a written text that they
could follow as they listened to the instructions. People
absorb information in different ways.50 Some people learn
47 See, e.g., Connor, supra note 44, at 7 ("When jurors would send out
questions asking about the meaning of a concept or term, the custom
was always to reread the instruction, as if the jurors would understand a
second recital with the renewed dulcet tones of the judicial officer.");
Mike Kataoka, Eschewing Obfuscation: The Judicial Council Strives
for Plain English with Its New Jury Instructions, CAL. LAW., Dec.
2000, at 52, 53 ("'[Judges] sit up there and read the instructions and
watch people really trying hard to understand. And often the judges
respond to questions simply by reading the same instructions louder."'
(quoting Justice Carol A. Corrigan, Chairwoman of the Judicial
Council Task Force on Jury Instructions and Chairwoman of the
Criminal Subcommittee in California)).
48 See, e.g., SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY
WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY 167 (2005) ("Adding insult to injury
from the jurors' perspective, judges sometimes would appear to turn a
cold shoulder when the jury asked them to clarify instructions or define
terms such as 'mitigating."').
49 See ILL. SUP. CT. COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 7 (2005 ed.).
5o See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Learn How They Learn: Knowing Modes of
Adult Education Helps Lawyers Create Successful Presentations,
13
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by listening, while others learn by reading. Some prefer to
take notes, while others do not. If instructions are delivered
in two different ways (lecture and written text) rather than
just one (lecture), and if note taking is permitted,51 the court
is more likely to reach a greater number of jurors and to
have them understand and remember the instructions.
52
Tiersma also suggests that jurors should be
permitted to ask the judge questions about the
instructions. 53 I wholeheartedly agree, and have made this
suggestion before. 54 As Tiersma notes, most teachers take
it for granted that questions are an important part of the
learning process. This is true in the classroom, and is likely
to be true in the courtroom too. Most judges would
probably shy away from this proposal because they worry
that they might say something that would be the basis for
reversal on appeal. 55  One empirical study's findings
A.B.A. J., Aug. 2003, at 26, 26 ("People learn in different ways.... A
good teacher will try to incorporate as many different learning
preferences into his or her instruction as possible.").
51 The trend is toward allowing jurors to take notes, see JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS 141-43 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997), but
not all courts have adopted this practice. See G. Thomas Munsterman
& Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Building on Bedrock: The Continued
Evolution of Jury Reform, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004, at 10, 15 ("Only a
small handful of states continue to restrict juror note taking.").
52 See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 19
("[M]aterial is better remembered when it is presented in several
different forms than in a single form. Having the jurors both listen to
and read the instructions should capitalize on this effect.").
53 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 146-47.
54 Marder, supra note 43, at 501 ("After the judge reads the
instructions to the jury, but before he or she sends the jury off to
deliberate, the judge should allow jurors to ask questions about the
instructions.").
55 See, e.g., James D. Wascher, The Long March Toward Plain English
Jury Instructions, CBA REC., Feb.-Mar. 2005, at 50, 54 (describing the
response of Cook County Circuit Court Judge Stuart A. Nudelman, a
past president of the Illinois Judges Association, to a jury's question on
the instructions: "[H]e declined to answer the jury's question both
14
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suggest that jurors' comprehension of the instructions
would improve if they were given the opportunity to ask
any questions they have about the instructions.
56
Judge Dann is likely to agree with this
recommendation because he is a believer in judge-jury
"dialogue." 57 Because of Judge Dann's jury reform efforts,
Arizona state court judges now instruct juries that have
reached an impasse that they can turn to the judge for
further assistance. 58  Rather than delivering the typical
"Allen charge," 59 in which jurors are pressured to go back
to the jury room and to try to reach a verdict, Arizona
judges can meet with the jury and see what the basis of the
impasse is and whether further argument by the lawyers or
dialogue with the judge would help the jury to overcome its
impasse. 60  The judge is permitted to play a more
constructive role, as is the jury.
If jurors are able to ask the judge questions about
the instructions, then they will not have to make up answers
during their deliberations. In most courtrooms, jurors are
not permitted to ask the judge any questions about the
because he was not entirely sure how to answer and because any
answer might well have been 'a guarantee of the appellate court saying
that, as the trial judge, I went too far and that it's the jury's job to
interpret instructions.').
56 See Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in
Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 551 (1992) ("A new finding
of this study is that jurors who requested help from the judge performed
substantially better than those subjects who did not. When the judge
responded by providing supplemental information, either in the form of
written instructions or by explaining the instructions in their own
words, the jurors' understanding of the instructions reached fairly high
levels (up to 67%).").
57 B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 283 (1996).
58 ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(h); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 22.4.
59 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (holding that there
was no error when the jury returned for further instructions and the trial
court judge instructed the jurors to reexamine their views).
60 See Dann & Logan, supra note 57, at 283.
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instructions immediately after they have been instructed. If
jurors have questions, then they can try to answer the
questions during their deliberations. Sometimes they arrive
at correct answers, other times they do not. Alternatively,
once the jury is deliberating it can send a note to the judge,
asking the judge the jury's question about the instructions.
Typically, the judge will respond, not by answering the
jury's question, but simply by gathering everyone in the
courtroom and rereading the relevant portion of the
instructions. The jurors become frustrated when the court's
only response is to reread a portion of the instructions,
which they did not understand the first time. After this
happens a few times, the jury realizes that it is not going to
obtain any answers from the judge so it stops turning to the
judge for assistance. In one case, a college professor who
served as the foreperson of a criminal jury in New York
reported that his jury simply stopped turning to the judge
when they discovered that the judge was unhelpful, as well
as cantankerous. 6 1  One law professor who conducted
interviews with jurors in several capital cases reported that
jurors stopped asking the judge questions about parts of the
instructions that they did not understand when the judge
simply reread portions of the instructions to them.62
Instead, they tried to provide their own explanations.
63
61 See D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 81 (2001).
62 See SUNDBY, supra note 48, at 49-50 (describing jurors who felt
intimidated by the process of having to return to the courtroom to hear
the judge reread portions of the instructions anytime the jury submitted
a question to the judge).
63 Id. at 50 ("'[W]e just tried to resolve any further disputes on our
own."') (quoting a juror).
16
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B. Permitting Jurors to Question Witnesses
Tiersma recommends that jurors be permitted to ask
the judge questions about the instructions, but he does not
suggest that jurors should be able to submit written
questions to the witnesses. This practice is explicitly
permitted in several states, 64 and explicitly prohibited in
other states. 65 In most states and federal circuits, however,
the decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge.
66
Allowing jurors to submit written questions to witnesses is
a reform that would benefit jurors enormously. They
would not have to remain confused or uncertain during the
trial; instead, they could get answers to their questions.
In states where juror questions to witnesses are
permitted, the jurors are typically given an opportunity at
the close of a witness' testimony to submit a written
question to the judge who then consults with the lawyers
and decides whether the question should be asked of the
witness. The questions are submitted anonymously and the
judge, after consultation with the lawyers, decides whether
64 See Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To
Ask or Not To Ask, That Is the Question, " 78 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 1099,
1100 (2003) (noting that Arizona, Florida, and Indiana permit jurors to
submit written questions to witnesses, and that Colorado intends to
adopt the practice in civil and criminal cases).
61 See id. (reporting that Mississippi prohibits juror questions to
witnesses in all cases, whereas Texas, Georgia, and Minnesota bar the
practice in criminal cases).
66 See Eugene A. Lucci, The Case for Allowing Jurors To Submit
Written Questions, 89 JUDICATURE 16 (2005) ("Every federal circuit
that has addressed the issue of juror questioning of witnesses agrees
that it is a practice that should be left entirely within the court's
discretion."); Bruce R. Pfaff, John M. Stalmack & Nancy S. Marder,
Jurors in Illinois Should Have the Right To Submit Questions To Be
Answered by Witnesses, CBA REC. (forthcoming May 2009) (providing
a survey of state court and federal circuit cases on juror questions to
witnesses, with most cases leaving the decision to the discretion of the
trial judge) (manuscript at 7-13, on file with authors).
17
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they are appropriate questions. If they are, then the judge
will ask them. If they are not, then the judge will explain to
the jury that this is not a question that can be asked.
Because the questions are submitted in written form at the
end of a witness' testimony, they do not interrupt the flow
of the trial.
This practice allows jurors to have their questions
answered as they arise, and jurors appreciate this
opportunity.6 7 Otherwise, they are left confused throughout
the trial and can only speculate as to answers during their
deliberations. Moreover, in the states that permit this
practice, judges, lawyers, and jurors have been satisfied
with it. In states where juror questions have been permitted
as part of a pilot program, the participants usually find that
they like the practice even if they resisted it initially.
68
Jurors' questions tend to be few in number and
67 See Lucci, supra note 66, at 17 (polling jurors and finding that
"jurors universally approve of and appreciate the ability to clear up
confusion by asking questions, and, combined with the ability to take
notes and having written jury instructions on the law, when jurors are
allowed to ask questions they feel very satisfied that they reached the
correct verdict").
68 See, e.g., Mott, supra note 64, at 1104-05 (reporting on a pilot study
in New Jersey state courts in which jurors and a majority of lawyers
responded favorably to the practice of permitting jurors to submit
written questions to witnesses, as did judges, including those who
"were initially skeptical, but after experience with questions in their
courtrooms, they were pleased with the results and expressed their
desire to continue after the pilot period ceased"); Patrick S. Pemberton,
Out of the Mouths of Jurors: In Los Angeles They're Letting the Jurors
Quiz Witnesses, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 18 ("[Tlhe judges who
participated in the pilot program [in L.A.] were generally pleased with
the results. And so were a large majority of the participating jurors,
according to a poll that was done."); Seventh Circuit American Jury
Project Final Report 60-62 (Sept. 2008) (surveying participants in the
Seventh Circuit's pilot program in which judges and jurors in particular
reported that the practice of permitting juror questions to witnesses
contributed to the fairness of the trial process and the jurors'
understanding of the case).
18
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reasonable. 69 Often, jurors seek clarification of a fact 7° or
greater explanation about a practice. 7 1 One pilot program
permitting juror questions to witnesses found that juror
questions do not add significantly to the length of a trial.
72
One theory is that juror questions to witnesses might even
reduce the time required for deliberations.7 3 Another
theory is that such questions might reduce the number of
hung juries, though no study has tested this theory yet.
Permitting jurors to submit written questions to
witnesses, just as permitting jurors to ask the judge
questions about the instructions, are practices designed to
give jurors the information they believe they need to decide
69 See Mott, supra note 64, at 1109 ("A study asking judges in Arizona
to rate the reasonableness of juror questions found that judges' ratings
were extremely high."); id. at 1112 (working from data collected for
other purposes from initiatives in Arizona, D.C., and Pennsylvania,
Mott found that "[o]f the 130 state-level cases, the average number of
questions jurors submitted per case was 16"); Lucci, supra note 66, at
17 ("I am currently in my fifth year of allowing jurors to propose
written questions, and have done so in well over 100 trials. Over that
period . . . the vast majority (over 90 percent) of juror questions are
good questions and many are excellent .... ").
70 See Mott, supra note 64 at 1117 ("Approximately one-fifth of the
juror questions asked witnesses to clarify factual evidence such as
exactly what events witnesses saw or more detailed facts about a person
or place."); Lucci, supra note 66, at 17 (observing that in his own
experience with juror questions in over 100 trials, "most questions seek
clarification of testimony regarding topics that have already been
touched upon by the witness, including testimony not heard or which
was vague or ambiguous").
71 See Mott, supra note 64, at 1115 ("Jurors inquired about typical
practices within a profession, whether the expert believed an event was
plausible, or what procedures an individual should have taken in a
given situation.").
72 See id. at 1109 (describing a study of the pilot program in New
Jersey that "found that the estimated median time added to trials
allowing questions was only thirty minutes").
73 See Lucci, supra note 66, at 18 ("Questioning is likely to save time
with improved understanding by the jurors, reduced questioning of
other witnesses, and shorter jury deliberations.").
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the case. Jurors typically exercise restraint in asking
questions, 74 but both practices would allow jurors to get
answers to the questions that they have rather than
remaining confused throughout the trial or after the
instructions and then speculating during deliberations.
Both of these reforms give jurors the opportunity to seek
answers to their questions when they arise so that when
they enter the jury room, they are prepared to deliberate.
75
C. Instructing Jurors on Deliberations
Courts typically do not give jurors any instructions
on deliberations. Tiersma described judges as being "quite
coy about how jurors should approach deliberations."
76
Judges are reticent to provide instructions about
deliberations because it is up to jurors to decide how to
conduct their deliberations. Judges are reluctant to intrude
into the province of the jury. However, some guidance
would be useful, and of course, jurors can still decide how
closely to follow the judge's instructions. Tiersma notes
that even the new California jury instructions do not give
jurors any advice on how to proceed with their
deliberations, other than some general admonitions.
77
Although Tiersma does not recommend that judges should
provide such guidance, I think it would be useful.78
74 See Mott, supra note 64, at 1109, 1112 (noting the reasonableness
and limited number of questions asked by jurors to witnesses); see also
Connor, supra note 44, at 7 (noting that jurors who received individual
written copies of the instructions did not send notes to the judge with
legal questions during their deliberations).
75 See Lucci, supra note 66, at 18 ("When a witness answers an
individual juror's questions, it helps to lay the proper foundation for
effective deliberations by the jury as a group.").
76 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 125.
17 See id
71 See Marder, supra note 43, at 503 (recommending that judges
instruct juries on deliberations).
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Instructions on deliberations can give jurors an idea of what
is expected of them and how to proceed. The jurors still
decide how to conduct their deliberations. When all the
jurors have an overview of deliberations, then when they
enter the jury room they can proceed without some jurors
feeling at a loss. Instead, all of the jurors will feel prepared
to participate in the deliberations.
One approach that judges can take to inform jurors
about the deliberation process without interfering in how
jurors actually decide to structure their deliberations is to
give each juror a copy of the American Judicature Society's
(AJS) pamphlet entitled Behind Closed Doors. A Guide for
Jury Deliberations.79 The AJS is a non-profit organization
committed to an independent judiciary. The pamphlet
gives jurors background information useful for
deliberations, such as the role of the foreperson, different
ways to conduct deliberations, the need to be respectful of
each juror's views, and what to do when the jury has a
question or cannot agree on a verdict. 80  Although the
information is general, it is nevertheless helpful. Thus, the
pamphlet can be viewed as a tool that aids jurors in
performing their tasks during deliberations. Rather than
being baffled or confused by what they are supposed to do
in the jury room, jurors receive some general guidance
from the court in the form of a pamphlet. Of course, jurors
can choose to depart from the suggestions, but at least they
enter the jury room with an overview of the process and
some understanding of possible ways to proceed.8 1 It is up
79 See generally AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: A
GUIDE FOR JURY DELIBERATIONS (1999) (providing general
information about deliberations).
" See id at 3-8.
81 Without such guidance on deliberations, some juries struggle with
how to proceed. See, e.g., Erin Emery, The Jury That Couldn't: Scenes
from a Mistrial in Teller County, DENV. POST, July 3, 2002, at IA
(quoting a juror in a first-degree murder trial who said: "'It was really
frustrating because we were not getting any help on how do you go
21
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to the jurors to decide when they want to follow the
suggestions and when they want to depart from them.
Another approach is that judges can instruct jurors
on the deliberation process. Any instructions, like the AJS
pamphlet, can be general so that jurors have basic
background information. The instructions also can present
jurors with an array of approaches as to how to organize
their deliberations, and they can choose which one makes
sense to them. Judge Kane, a Federal District Court Judge,
decided to draft instructions that would inform jurors about
deliberations after he read Graham Burnett's account of his
jury duty in A Trial By Jury, in which Burnett expressed his
frustration with the court for failing to provide any
guidance as to deliberations. 82 Judge Kane then published
his instructions in The Judges' Journal,83 a journal whose
audience consists largely of fellow judges. His
instructions, like the AJS pamphlet, are informative without
being intrusive. Other judges can adopt them or use them
as a model for developing their own instructions. Indeed,
he tells jurors: "I am not directing you how to proceed, but
I offer the following suggestions that other juries have
found helpful so that you can proceed in an orderly fashion
.... ,84 Another advantage of Judge Kane's instruction is
that he includes guidance on the dynamics of deliberation,
including suggestions that jurors participate fully, listen to
each other carefully, avoid interrupting each other,
deliberate before taking a vote, express respect for each
other, and proceed with patience. 85 Some states, such asMichigan, are beginning to provide such instructions,
about this, how do you approach the situation. You're supposed to
decide the outcome of a man's life-blind-and that's not
acceptable."').
82 BURNETT, supra note 61, at 79-85.
81 John L. Kane, Giving Trials a Second Look, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004, at
28, 30-31 (providing instruction).
84 Id. at 30.
" Id. at 30-31.
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though Michigan's instruction does not provide as much
guidance as Judge Kane's instruction. 86 Judges can work
from either Judge Kane's instruction or Michigan's
instruction so that they do not have to reinvent the wheel.
The key point is that judges can provide jurors with
information on deliberations so that they are fully informed
and understand their tasks. The instruction or pamphlet
serves as a tool that enables jurors to be active participants
in their deliberations. The traditional reason for not giving
such an instruction-wariness about intruding into the
province of the jury-though respectful of the jury's
independence, often leaves jurors mystified or confused.
There is a middle ground, whereby judges can provide
background information and set forth possible ways the
jury might proceed, but the court also can instruct jurors
that they decide how to organize their deliberations.
D. Instructing Jurors on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony
Another area in which judges are reluctant to
intrude is how jurors should assess the credibility of
eyewitness testimony. Typically, courts do not offer any
instructions on eyewitness reliability or allow expert
witnesses to testify on the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony because assessing the credibility of eyewitness
testimony is supposed to be solely within the province of
the jury. Judges also tend to believe that this assessment is
based on commonsense. Thus, there is no need for expert
testimony. The difficulty is that there have been myriad
empirical studies showing that eyewitness recollections can
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be very unreliable. 87 Our commonsense tells us that we can
believe what we see, and therefore, we can believe what
eyewitnesses claim to have seen. However, empirical
studies show that there are many factors that contribute to
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and unless jurors
are made aware of these factors, they will tend to think that
eyewitness testimony is more reliable than it really is.
88
The factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness
testimony include: how far the eyewitness was from the
person being observed; the conditions, such as whether
there was bad weather or poor lighting; how much time
there was for observation; the health of the eyewitness;
whether the eyewitness and the person being observed were
of the same race because cross-racial identifications are
harder to make; and how much stress the eyewitness was
under because contrary to common belief, the more stress a
person is under, the less reliable the identification is.
89
In California, as Tiersma explains, judges now
instruct jurors on the factors that can affect the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. 9° California judges, by instructing in
this way, provide more information on this subject than
judges in most other jurisdictions. However, as Tiersma
notes, California judges do not go far enough. They
instruct jurors to consider whether the eyewitness and the
person being observed are of different races, but they do
not say why this is important. They do not explain to jurors
that cross-racial identifications are more difficult to make
87 See, e.g., Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sci. AM., Dec.
1974, at 23 (discussing studies).
88 See, e.g., ELIZABETH LOFTUS & JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY 26 (1987) ("Another reason that jurors place so much faith
on eyewitness testimony is that they are often unaware of how many
different factors influence its accuracy.").
89 See, e.g., Buckhout, supra note 87, at 23, 24-27 (identifying factors
that make eyewitness identification unreliable).
90 See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 126.
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than identifications between people of the same race. 91
Tiersma rightly criticizes the instruction for this omission
because it leaves jurors to "guess" or "to read the judge's
mind. 92  His point is well taken; the instruction should
provide this additional piece of information.
However, there is even more information, in
addition to the challenges posed by cross-racial
identifications, which would be useful for jurors to have.
For example, researchers in this area have found that
eyewitness testimony is more likely to be believed than any
other form of evidence. 93  Even when other forms of
evidence undermine the eyewitness identification, jurors
will continue to believe the eyewitness testimony. So,
perhaps something stronger than even an instruction in
which the judge describes the factors that contribute to the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony is needed.
There is much disagreement as to how to counter
the strongly held belief that we can believe what we see,
91 See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 82 (1988)
(identifying several factors that are not commonly known and that
make eyewitness identification unreliable including the difficulty
people have in identifying people of other races); Buckhout, supra note
87, at 26 (describing a study in which stereotypes limit what viewers
see and recall).
92 Tiersma, supra note 1, at 126.
93 See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9 (1979)
("Jurors have been known to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to
guilt even when it is far outweighed by evidence of innocence.");
LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 88, at 24 (describing studies of mock
jurors that show that they tend to believe eyewitness testimony
particularly when it was given with confidence); John C. Brigham &
Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors To Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 27
(1983) (noting that jurors find eyewitness evidence extremely
persuasive).
94 See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 91, at 79-82 (providing
examples of erroneous eyewitness identification that persuaded juries
in spite of strong alibi defenses by the defendants).
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and therefore, we can believe what an eyewitness says he
or she has seen. An instruction is a good starting-point.
95
California is ahead of the curve in this respect, even with
the shortcoming identified by Tiersma on cross-racial
identifications. Other recommendations include allowing
the testimony of experts who can explain more fully the
factors that the judge mentioned in the instruction 96 or
providing jurors with some of the findings gained from the
empirical studies as a way of showing them that eyewitness
testimony should be open to question. Suggestions that are
more controversial include the exclusion of any evidence
that is based only on eyewitness testimony. 97 Some courts,
like those in California, instruct juries on the factors that
can affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Other
courts have allowed the testimony of experts. 98 There is a
need for greater experimentation by courts so that a "best
practice" emerges. The one point that is clear is that
courts' predilection to take no action and to avoid the
problem is not a useful approach. It does not give juries the
95 See id. at 84 (noting that some courts, if requested by one of the
parties, give a cautionary instruction in which they "inform the jury that
identification evidence can be wrong and encourage them to scrutinize
it carefully").
96 See id. (noting that a "more controversial, more prevalent, and
potentially more effective" approach than a cautionary instruction is to
allow parties to call experts "to testify about perception, memory, and
eyewitness testimony").
97 Compare id. at 83-84 ("One [way to assist jurors with eyewitness
testimony] is to exclude it altogether in cases where it stands alone,
without corroboration. This alternative is plainly unacceptable. It
would needlessly paralyze too many legitimate criminal
prosecutions."), with Michael J. Gorman, Eyewitnesses Make Serious
Mistakes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A21 (describing the
misidentification of Bryant Gumbel's son as a suspected purse-snatcher
and recommending that eyewitness "identification alone should never
lead to a criminal conviction").
98 See, e.g., KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 91, at 85 (describing
Judges Bazelon and Weinstein as "particularly strong advocates of
using eyewitness experts").
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information they need to perform their task in a responsible
manner. The consequence of relying too heavily on
eyewitness testimony can be quite serious; it can lead to an
erroneous conviction.
99
IV. Courts Should Seek Jurors Drawn Broadly from
the Community
A. Rejecting Expert Juries
Tiersma observes that courts require jurors to be
experts in several different areas and he suggests that juries
of experts might be useful where expertise is needed.
Tiersma proposes that an expert jury could be used to
decide technical cases, such as tax fraud cases.100 He
proposes that in "highly technical areas" it would "make
sense on occasion" to have a jury of experts.' 0' For
example, in a tax fraud case, he suggests that a jury of
accountants "might not be a bad idea.
'1°2
Tiersma is not the first to suggest a jury of experts
in technical areas, but this idea has been rejected in the past
and should continue to be rejected. Expert juries have a
number of drawbacks compared to juries of ordinary
citizens drawn broadly from the community. This
recommendation, rather than broadening the base of
citizens who could serve as jurors, would limit the base. It
would lead to limited viewpoints being made available to
the jury, limited opportunities for ordinary citizens to serve,
and would cast doubt on the integrity of a process by which
ordinary citizens were bypassed in favor of experts.
99 See, e.g., DNA Clears Man in Rape, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2006, at A21 (describing the case of Larry Fuller, who was convicted
of rape based on the eyewitness identification of the victim; however,
he was eventually exonerated based on DNA evidence).
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One drawback to a jury of experts, who serve in
trial after trial, is that they are unable to bring a fresh look
to a case that a jury drawn from ordinary citizens who serve
in only one trial could bring. Justice White recognized this
limitation when he described the protections that a jury
affords a defendant in a criminal case. He suggested that a
criminal defendant might prefer the commonsense
judgment of a jury of ordinary citizens, even though they
are unschooled in the law,' 0 3 to the expertise of a judge
because the judge might become hardened over time.
10 4
Expert jurors, who would be expected to serve in trial after
trial, run this risk just as readily as do judges who hear
criminal cases time after time.
Another drawback to the expert jury is that it is
necessarily drawn from a limited pool of people who meet
certain professional or technical requirements so that they
qualify as experts. Thus, the expert jury would not be
drawn from a broad swath of the population and would not
have available to it the full range of perspectives, life
experiences, and commonsense judgment that a jury of
ordinary citizens could offer. A jury consisting of experts,
many of whom might have gone to the same schools,
received the same professional training, and share the same
attitudes or views that are prevalent in that profession,
might be bereft of any jurors who can offer an outsider's
perspective or critique. In addition, a jury of experts raises
questions about how representative that jury is of the
population at large and whether the expert jury is being
103 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("If the
defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it.").
104 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose of
a jury is . . . to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or
biased response of a judge.").
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used as a screen to justify the exclusion of other members
of society from serving as jurors. Justice White observed
that "[r]estricting jury service to only special groups . . .
cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury
trial. . . . Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a
pool broadly representative of the community... .,105
Another limitation is that it is difficult to decide
which areas are technical and would require expert juries
and which areas are general and could be heard by juries of
ordinary citizens. The technical categories for which
expert juries are needed are likely to grow until they
overtake the general category for which ordinary juries are
needed.
Finally, as Alexis de Tocqueville reminds us, the
jury is above all "a political institution."' 0 6 One way in
which it functions as a political institution is that it serves
as a "free school" and teaches ordinary citizens about the
importance of fulfilling their civic duty and serving as
jurors. 107 Casting a vote and serving on a jury are the two
ways in which citizens participate in their democracy.
Jurors who lack the background to serve as expert jurors
are denied an opportunity to participate in the judicial
system and to acquire that education. Although they might
eventually have the chance to serve on a jury, their chances
are reduced with the creation of expert juries, particularly
when expert juries burgeon as all cases begin to take on a
technical sheen.
Tiersma's fallback position is that there could be
one or two experts on any jury that is asked to decide a
technical issue. 10 8 He notes that lawyers tend to use their
peremptory challenges to remove from the jury anyone who
105 Id. at 530.
106 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 250.
107 Id. at 252.
'0' See Tiersma, supra note 1, at 139.
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has relevant expertise. 109 He realizes that lawyers are likely
to object to any proposal that an expert or two should be
seated on the jury in a technical case. Although there is no
guarantee of having an expert on one's jury, it seems that
peremptory challenges should not be used simply to
remove all prospective jurors who might have some
expertise."l 0 To the extent that a jury drawn broadly from
the populace will have a range of views available to it,
including Jurors with expertise, eliminating peremptory
challenges 1 or at least reducing the number of peremptory
challenges would avoid or limit the skewing effect of
lawyers who exercise their challenges to exclude
prospective jurors with expertise. If lawyers had fewer
peremptory challenges, then they would use their
challenges with greater care and try to remove those
prospective jurors whose impartiality they doubted but who
did not meet the standard for a for cause challenge.
Although Tiersma does not go this far in his
recommendations, this seems to be a better approach than
expert juries, which pose a threat to juries of ordinary
citizens and do not have the advantages of juries drawn
broadly from the community.
109 See id.
110 According to one prospective juror's observation, "we potential
jurors discovered that anyone who knew anything about costs or the
medical profession had been screened out-an economist, an
accountant, and two nurses." Robert J. Barro, Pleading the Case for a
Paid-Jury System, Bus. WK., July 22, 2002, at 20.
111 My view has long been that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated rather than simply reduced in number. See Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041 (1995). For a recommendation made by
Professor David Baldus that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated or limited to three per lawyer, see Debra Cassens Weiss,
Law Prof Who Studied Peremptories Suggests Three-Strike Limit,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/law_
prof who_studied _peremptories suggests three-strike limit.
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Moreover, before taking the dramatic leap to expert
juries, ordinary citizens should be given the basic tools
necessary to perform their tasks, particularly when
expertise is required. For example, when juries have to
decide damage awards, they should be permitted to use
calculators and Excel spreadsheets, which are basic tools
that any expert would employ. 11 2 These tools are common
in the workplace, and should be common in the jury room.
These tools are not particularly expensive and would aid
jurors in making the calculations that they need to make.
Not too long ago, jurors were asked to make calculations
about damages but were not even permitted to have paper
and pencil in the jury room. Most courtrooms now allow
such basic tools as paper and pencil."l 3 Courts need to take
the next step and provide calculators and Excel
spreadsheets to jurors. Before Tiersma criticizes ordinary
jurors for their lack of expertise, he should insist that courts
provide them with the basic tools that would enable them to
perform the tasks they have been asked to perform.
B. Reaching Out To Prospective Jurors
Tiersma does not mention the myriad ways in which
courts have reached out to prospective jurors and have tried
to summon them from a broader swath of the population
than ever before. Courts are moving in the right direction,
though more remains to be done. For example, courts used
to summon jurors from voter registration lists only, 1 4 but
112 For a detailed discussion of the high-tech and low-tech tools,
including spread-sheets and calculators, that jurors should be given to
help them perform their tasks, see Nancy S. Marder, Juries and
Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 1257, 1286 (2001).
113 See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 141 (describing
juror note-taking as "a widespread technique").
114 See, e.g., David Kairys, Joseph B. Kadane & John P. Lehoczky,
Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL.
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now many courts use multiple lists, such as tax rolls,
drivers' licenses, unemployment lists, or utilities, in
addition to voter registration lists." 5 The idea is to reach as
many people as possible and not to rely on just one source.
Many more people are qualified to serve as jurors than
people who register to vote. In addition, courts have done a
better job of updating the addresses that they use when
mailing questionnaires and summonses. This is important
given how often people move.
Several trial courts have been innovative in trying to
increase minority representation among those who are
summoned to serve; however, appellate courts have not
viewed these efforts with favor. When a district court in
Michigan "subtracted" potential jurors from the master
wheel because they were not African Americans in order to
create a more diverse venire, 116 the Sixth Circuit struck
down the practice, 117 holding that it violated a federal
statute that prohibited selection based on race 118 and that it
also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 9  When a district
L. REV. 776, 825-26 (1977) ("The most widely used primary list is the
voter registration list. . ."); id at 778 (noting that in 1977, "only two
federal district courts and several state courts utilize[d] multiple lists")
(footnotes omitted).
15 See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 51, at 36 ("As of August
1996, 12 states use only voter registration lists, six states use only lists
of licensed drivers, two states use state-unique lists, and 25 use a
combined voters and drivers list. Five states add some additional lists
to the voters and drivers lists.").
116 See Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror
Selection: Cross-Section by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273 (1996)
(describing the use of stratified juror selection by the Eastern District of
Michigan).
17 United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6'1 Cir. 1998).
118 See Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 ("[N]o citizen
shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district
courts of the United States ... on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.").
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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court judge in Massachusetts tried to create a more diverse
venire by ordering new jury summonses to be mailed to
residents who lived in the same zip code as jury
summonses returned to the court as "undeliverable," the
First Circuit granted the government's petition for a writ of
mandamus and directed the district court judge not to
implement that part of her order calling for new jury
summonses. 12  The First Circuit concluded that an
individual judge could not enlarge the jury array; rather, it
had to be done on a district-wide level. 121 Appellate courts
must become more supportive of innovative efforts by
district court judges; otherwise, venires are unlikely to
reflect the larger communities from which they are drawn.
Meanwhile, academics have studied why people do
not always respond to their jury questionnaire or summons.
One study discovered that while some never received their
questionnaire or summons, and others are deterred by
practicalities, such as the absence of childcare, the
unavailability of parking, or the meager compensation, the
most important factor was whether people felt that they had
some control over when they performed their jury duty.'
22
As long as they felt that they had some control, especially
in terms of timing, the potential jurors were more likely to
respond to their questionnaire and their summons and feel
enthusiastic about jury duty. 123  If courts focused on
offering prospective jurors some control over when they
performed their jury duty, such as an automatic extension
when they are first called, then less time would be spent
120 United States v. Green, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
121 See Judge Nancy Gertner, 12 Angry Men (and Women) in Federal
Court, 82 CHI. KENT L. REv. 613, 623 (2007) (providing background to
Green).
122 See Susan Carol Losh et al., "Reluctant Jurors": What Summons
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imposing fines 124 or having marshals search for additional
prospective jurors. 1
25
Courts' efforts to send jury questionnaires and
summonses to as broad a swath of the population as
possible have proceeded slowly, but at least they are
moving in the right direction. The challenge of summoning
a diverse venire depends upon the efforts of many
participants, including innovative efforts by trial courts,
support for these efforts by appellate courts, and greater
understanding by researchers of why prospective jurors do
not always respond to their summonses. The goal is to
reach as diverse a group of citizens as possible for the
venire, and then not to lose them during the exercise of
peremptory challenges. Ideally, the petit jury that is
actually seated is drawn broadly from the community, can
offer a range of views and experiences, and can render a
verdict that will be accepted by the community, even if the
community disagrees with the verdict.
V. Conclusion
Most of Tiersma's recommendations encourage
courts to be honest with jurors and to give them the tools
they need to perform their jobs ably. His recommendations
could go further, as I have suggested above, but they are
124 See, e.g., Colin F. Campbell & Bob James, Innovations in Jury
Management from a Trial Court's Perspective, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004,
at 22, 25 (describing Arizona's enforcement efforts for those
summoned for jury duty, including orders to show cause and up to
$500 penalties for those held in contempt); Greg Moran, When Jury
Duty Calls. Counties Wrestle with High Evasion Rates, CAL. LAW.,
May 2001, at 22 (describing that in California failure to appear for jury
duty is an act of contempt punishable by a fine up to $1000 and five
days in jail).
125 Moran, supra note 124, at 22 (explaining that in Stanislaus County,
California, a "failure to appear" postcard follows an ignored jury
summons, and if that fails to elicit a response within ten days, then a
uniformed marshal with an order to show cause can appear at the door).
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consistent with the basic principles by which courts should
approach jury reform. The only recommendation for which
this is not the case is the creation of expert juries. This
recommendation runs counter to the principle that juries
should be drawn broadly from the community. This
principle is important for several reasons. First, by drawing
on ordinary citizens from all walks of life, a jury will
potentially have available to it a wide range of viewpoints,
perspectives, and life experiences. Second, a deliberation
among jurors from diverse backgrounds will allow for
questions, challenges, and the avoidance of what Irving
Janis called "groupthink," in which jurors simply go along
with the prevailing point of view. 12  Third, such juries of
ordinary citizens, working together and participating
actively in a thorough deliberation, can reach a just verdict
and one that the community is willing to accept.
Surprisingly, such a jury is also more likely to reach an
accurate verdict. James Surowiecki described this
phenomenon in The Wisdom of Crowds.12 7 He suggested
that when a group engages in a deliberative process in
which the participants have different viewpoints and skills
and feel free to offer them, they will reach a more accurate
result than a homogeneous group, even one with
expertise, 128 or than one or two people, "no matter how
smart they are." 129  Thus, when jurors are treated with
honesty by courts and given the information and tools to be
active participants, they are more likely to render accurate
verdicts. If Surowiecki is right, then we need to worry less
about creating expert juries and more about creating
conditions that will allow juries of ordinary citizens to
achieve the wisdom of crowds.
126 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 262, 270-71 (2d ed. 1982).
127 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005).
128 Id. at 30-31.
129 Id. at 3 1.
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